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Summary
The Council Directive 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, known as
Seveso II Directive, aims at the prevention of major accidents in high risk industries, and the limitation of their consequences for human
beings and environment. Although rules are well established to identify maximal hazard potential, there is no recognised method for taking
into account, in the assessment of risk level, safety devices and safety management systems implemented by operators.
This paper deals with the second stage of a global methodology aiming at better assessing benefits gained from safety devices and safety
management systems, through accident scenarios selection.
The methodology presented in this paper enables risk assessorsand competent authorities to identify Reference Accidents Scenarios
(RAS), by taking into account the influence of some safety barriers, in accordance with the Seveso II Directive requirements.
This method could help stakeholders involved in the public risk-based decision-making process to evaluate the safety level of high-risk
establishments.
Since the risk management decisions are based on the risk assessment [ 12 ], and since the choices and hypothesis to define the RAS are
arbitrary, there is a need to reach a consensus among all the stakeholders to limit the discrepancy in the decision and improve the
transparency.
Résumé
La Directive européenne 96/82/EC du 9 Décembre 1982 sur le contrôle des accidents majeurs impliquant des substances dangereuses,
connue également sous le nom de Directive Seveso II, a pour objectif la prévention des accidents majeurs dans les sites industriels à hauts
risques, et la limitation de leurs conséquences pour les populations et l'environnement. Bien que les règles soient bien établies pour
l'identification du risque potentiel, il n'y a pas de méthode reconnue pour la prise en compte, dans l'évaluation du potentiel maximal de
danger, des dispositifs de sécurité et des systèmes de gestion de la sécurité mis en œuvre par les exploitants.
Cet article traite de la seconde étape d'une méthodologie générale, qui vise à mieux évaluer les améliorations apportées par les dispositifs
de sécurité et des systèmes de gestion de la sécurité, à travers la sélection des scénarios d'accidents.
La méthode présentée dans cet article permet aux évaluateurs du risque ainsi qu'aux autorités compétentes d'identifier les Scénarios
Accidentels de Référence, qui prennent en compte l'influence de certaines barrières de sécurité, en accord avec les exigences de la
Directive Seveso II.
Cette méthode pourrait aider les parties prenantes impliquées dans le processus décisionnel de gestion publique basé sur les risques, afin
d'évaluer le niveau de sécurité des établissements à hauts risques.
Comme les décisions de gestion des risques sont basées sur l'évaluation des risques, et comme les choix et les hypothèses pour définir les
Scénarios Accidentels de Référence sont arbitraires, il est nécessaire d'obtenir un consensus parmi les parties prenantes, afin de limiter les
divergences dans les décisions et améliorer la transparence.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Context
In several European countries, hazard potential around high-risk
industries is often deducted from effect distances, as results of
the evaluation of gravity and likelihood of major accident
scenarios. Therefore, the identification of accident scenarios
appears as a critical point in the risk analysis process, that
should take into account measures related to "state of art" and
philosophy of the SEVESO II Directive.
The Directive gives the rules to identify high-risk potential
establishments with a precise criterion, which is the amount of
hazardous substances handled.
The lessons learnt from the control of hazardous installations and
improvement of the state of the art lead more and more to
integrate the hazard reduction directly at the conception level,
with the concepts of inherent safety.
Therefore, often the choices of some alternatives in the control of
the installation reduce significantly the hazard (size of the
vessels, distance between two units or storage). It appears then
clearly that the only consideration of the amount of hazardous
substances handled on the site is too rough.
There is a need to take into account some more representative
criteria in complement with the amount of substances.
Because of a lack of methodology, it is now particularly difficult to
point out the influence of risk reducing measures, especially
when determining accident scenarios. This difficulty is particularly
relevant in France, where a deterministic approach is adopted
[1 ] -
The underlying philosophy of this approach is based on the idea
that measures implemented to protect people from worst cases
accidents will also protect them in case of an accident of less
gravity, regardless of any probabilistic matters.
1.2 Proposition of an overall methodology
Regarding the considerations developed in the previous
paragraph, an overall approach has been developed in order to
valorise the positive results of safety devices and safety
management systems, in an industrial group or in an industrial
activity. The method, in a deterministic context, emphasises:
1
- The hazard potential inherent to an industrial plant, by the
definition of Maximum Physically Possible Scenarios
(MPPS) ;
- The influence of risk reducing measures described for example
in standards, regulations, by the definition of the Reference
Accident Scenarios (RAS) ;
- The benefits brought by safety devices and safety
management systems, by the definition of Residual Risk
Assessment Scenarios (RRAS).
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Figure 1 : Scenario Identification
This method is being developed with the French Competent
Authorities in charge of the application of the Seveso II Directive
[7,9].
The following paragraphs deal with:
- a brief recall about the identification method of Maximum
Physically Possible Scenarios, which is the topic of a paper
presented at the 2001 ESREL Conference [ 6 ] ;
- safety barriers and their influence, through the identification of
Reference Accident Scenarios (RAS) and Residual Risk
Assessment Scenarios (RRAS).
Throughout the description of the methodology, some illustrations
by a practical example will be given, based in particular on the
study of a pressurised vessel of liquid chlorine at ambient
temperature. These elements of illustration are referred to in the
text by the symbol "X"-
2. FIRST STEP: DETERMINATION OF MAXIMUM
PHYSICALLY POSSIBLE SCENARIOS (MPPS)
The method to identify Maximum Physically Possible Scenarios
(MPPS) is described in the paper presented at the 2001 ESREL
Conference [ 6 ] . The following paragraphs summarise the
method.
2.1 Definitions and Hypothesis
MPPS identification is regarded as an attempt to quantity
maximum hazard potential in industrial establishments, following
an specific algorithm.
This algorithm is based on the labelling of the substances
(Directive 67/548/EEC and Seveso II Directive), the conditions of
their use (pressure, temperature, solutions...) and the type of
containment.
As stated in the introduction, Maximum Physically Possible
Scenarios characterise the hazard potential inherent to high-risk
establishments. In a simpler way, it can be noticed that these
scenarios determine the worst situations that could physically
occur.
Generally, a scenario is assimilated as a succession of events
presented in (Fig 2), which is inspired from the bow-tie approach
presented in [ 3 ].
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Figure 2: Accident Scenario Identification
At this stage, the methodology will enable to quantify the hazard
potential of a unit by the definition of Maximum Physically
Possible Scenarios (MPPS). For this purpose, it is important to
identify the worst cases that could possibly occur, regardless of
any probabilistic matters.
In consequence, the following hypothesis can be reasonably
made to determine MPPS:
- the eventual prevention and protection barriers are supposed
to be inoperative,
- there is no need to determine the possible causes of the
accident. The MPPS must be representative of the worst
cases. As a matter of fact, such scenarios are most of the time
justified by external aggressions such as natural catastrophes
(earthquakes,...) or domino effects.
Thus, in a deterministic approach, a MPPS depends only on the
nature and the properties of the dangerous substance, and the
characteristics of the equipment involved. Therefore, MPPS is
fully determined by the following triplet:
- the Critical Event (CE), which is determined by the physical
state of the substance handled,
- the Secondary Critical Events (SCE), that can be completely
defined by the type of equipment and the conditions of use of
the substance,
- the Dangerous Phenomena (DP), that are linked to the physical
state and the hazards of the substance, regardless of the type
of equipment involved.
2.2 Methodology for MPPS identification
2.2.1 First step: definition of Critical Events and Secondary
Critical Events
The first step of the methodology consists in determining the
Critical Event. Clearly, this Critical Event is closely linked to the
physical state of the substance involved.
X For a pressurised vessel of chlorine, the Critical Event is a
loss of containment.
Once the critical event is characterised, it is possible to deduce
the possible Secondary Critical Events (SCE) from the type of
equipment, by using a classification of industrial equipment,
based upon the work performed by the Major Risk Research
Centre (Faculté Polytechnique de Mons, Belgium) on domino
effects [4, 5].
Practically, a matrix, called SCE matrix, is available for each
equipment category and defines the Secondary Critical Events,
according to the operating conditions of use of the hazardous
substance [6] .
For a pressurised vessel,
follows [6]:
the SCE matrix is described as
1.ln case of a substance handled under pressure above
boiling point (two-phase equilibrium), the SCE are:
- For a catastrophic rupture: puff (including aerosols),
missiles and overpressure;
- For a breach or pipe rupture: gas release, two-phase
release (jet) and pool formation.
2. In case of a substance handled below boiling point with
inert gas (liquid state), the SCE are:
- For a catastrophic rupture: missiles and overpressure;
- For a breach or pipe rupture: pool formation.
3. In case of a substance handled in a purely gaseous state,
the SCE are:
- For a catastrophic rupture: gas puff, missiles and
overpressure;
- Fora breach or pipe rupture: gas release.
2.2.2 Second step: definition of Dangerous Phenomena (DP)
In order to complete the definition of Maximum Physically
Possible Scenarios, the Dangerous Phenomena (DP) must be
identified.
In a similar way as in step 1, the definition of the Dangerous
Phenomena is realised, regardless of the type of equipment,
considering only the properties of the substances (hazards and
physical state).
To classify the hazardous substances, the methodology relies on
the Council Directive 67/548/EC on the classification, labelling
and packaging of dangerous substances, and more precisely, on
the definition of the risk phrases.
X Chlorine is classified as a toxic substance (risk phrase: R23).
The only Dangerous Phenomenon to consider is then toxic
gas dispersion.
2.2.3 Third step: checking the consistence between DP and SCE
Finally, it is necessary to ensure that SCE identified may actually
lead to the DP regarded. For this purpose, the methodology
suggests the use of a matrix, called the SCE/DP matrix.
In most cases, the consistence between SCE and DP is
immediate.
X In the practical case of a pressurised chlorine vessel, the
consistence of SCE and DP is immediate.
It is now possible to completely define the MPPS in order to






Figure 3: MPPS fora pressurised vessel of chlorine
2.3 Improvement of the approach
The identification of the possible scenarios according to the
combination of the equipment and hazardous substance results
of a systematic algorithmic approach.
This method applies to most frequently met cases in high-risk
industries and follows a deterministic approach.
MPPS identification should not be regarded as a final goal, but
as an attempt to quantify maximum hazard potential in industrial
establishments.
It is of interest to carry on the hazard assessment that has to be
implemented in accordance with the requirements of the Seveso
II Directive.
3. FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS: SAFETY
BARRIERS. IDENTIFICATION OF REFERENCE
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS (RAS) AND RESIDUAL
RISK ASSESSMENT SCENARIOS (RRAS)
The present chapter aims at presenting the method for
identification of Reference Accident Scenarios (RAS), and
Residual Risk Assessment Scenarios (RRAS). The method had
been developed in a project supported by the French Ministry of
Environment. The approach is described in a draft document [ 7 ]
and was applied in five "Seveso II" establishments in France [ 8 ].
RAS and RRAS are based on MPPS, completed with the
influence of safety barriers.
In this chapter, the first paragraph presents some preliminary
considerations about safety barriers.
The second paragraph deals with the identification method of
RAS, from theory to practical examples.
In the third paragraph, some preliminary considerations are given
about identification method of RRAS, which is currently in
progress.
3.1 Safety barriers
A safety barrier can be defined as a specific safety element,
which aims at achieving a safety function. This paragraph
presents:
- A definition of safety functions,
- A method for identification and classification of the safety
barriers,
- An illustration of the method by some case studies.
3.1.1 Definition of safety functions
The bow-tie approach adapted from [ 3 ] and presented in Fig. 2
describes accident scenarios as succession and / or a
combination of events. The transition from one event to another
more catastrophic can be controlled by safety functions. A safety
function can be achieved either by intrinsic or inherent safety,
included in the design of equipment, or by additional safety
barriers.
The safety level of an installation depends on the reliability of the
safety functions, achieved by the quality of safety barriers [ 9 ].
X For a pressurised vessel of chlorine, some relevant safety
functions are:
- prevent an overpressure,
- prevent an overflow,
- prevent from corrosion,
- protect from mechanical shocks,
- protect from thermal effects,
3.12 Method for identification and classification of the safety
barriers
When studying an industrial case, a step of the risk management
consists in identifying the safety barriers that achieve the safety
functions identified in the risk analysis. One or several safety
barriers can achieve a safety function.
In order to identify the safety barriers, information can be found in
national and international standards and regulations, which
present safety requirements for design and operation of industrial
unit. The current practices or "state of the art" for a given unit
may also provide a range of safety elements, which are often
implemented in high-risk industries.
Legal and normative requirements, as current practices, are
generally resulting of lessons learnt from passed major
accidents.
The identified safety barriers can be classified, according to
several criteria.
A first obvious classification consists in distinguishing prevention,
and mitigation / protection barriers. Several detailed classification
methods have been analysed in the reference [10]. From this
analysis, it is proposed to classify the safety barriers as follows:
- inherent safety barriers: barriers related to the design of the
equipment,
- additional passive barriers: barriers that don't require an
external power source for its successful operation,
- additional automatic barriers: safety system with full
automatic actions from detection to the return to a safe state,
- additional manual barriers: safety system that requires
manual actions by an operator to the return to a safe state.
X For a pressurised vessel of chlorine, one of the relevant
safety functions is the prevention of an internal overpressure.
It can be achieved:
- by designing the vessel for the maximum possible pressure
(inherent safety barrier),
- by pressure relief valve (additional passive barrier),
- by detection and automatic subsequent actions (automatic
safety system),
- by detection and manual actions (manual safety system).
The implementation of this classification is quite simple and is of
relevance to highlight the inherent and passive safety barriers
that contribute to the risk control with often a high availability.
When identified, they can be mentioned in the safety report
required by the Seveso II Directive.
This approach can be completed with an assessment of the
quality of the barriers according to the following criteria [10 ] :
- efficiency,
- availability (reliability and maintainability),
- other criteria related to the practical use of the barriers
(response time, operational in given range of ambient
conditions like temperature, pressure, relative humidity, frost,
corrosive atmosphere...).
The inherent and passive safety barriers are obviously
characterised by a high level of performance regarding these
criteria.
3.13 Case studies
Some current Initiating Events, Critical Events and Dangerous
Phenomena are listed here below, and for each event, several
safety barriers are proposed (non-exhaustive). The category of
the safety barrier is specified as follows:
1.inherent safety barriers,
2. additional passive barriers,
3.additional automatic barriers,
4.additional manual barriers.
a) Safety barriers on Initiating Events
- Overpressure, overflow, under-pressure: quality of
materials (1), steel thickness (1), rupture disk, vent (2);
- External or internal corrosion: quality of materials (1 ), steel
thickness (1), cladding (2), painting (2), coating (2),
cathodic protection (2), inspection (4), tests (4);
- Human error: operation(s) requiring specific qualification
and training (4);
- Mechanical shock: quality of materials (1 ), steel thickness
(1), double containment (2), wire netting (2), pipe-in-pipe
configuration (2);
- Thermal effects: fire wall (2), foam systems (3), water
curtains (3).
b) Safety barriers on Critical Events
- Ignition: requirements of hazardous classification areas (3);
- Pool: bound (2);
- Puff: containment room (2);
- Gas, liquid or two-phase release: reduced pipe diameter
(1), non-return valve (2).
c) Safety barriers on Dangerous Phenomena
- Toxic gas dispersion: ventilation and treatment system (2);
- BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) and
Boil Over: deluge systems (3).
3.2 Identification of Reference Accident Scenarios
3.2.1 Theoretical method development
In the framework of the Seveso II Directive, there is a need to
assess the hazard potential and demonstrate its control. The
ASSURANCE project [ 11 ] shows the discrepancies between the
assessment of the risk experts, particularly for the definition of
accidents scenarios.
This result is due to the numerous parameters involved in the
definition of a scenario, and the arbitrary choices made by the
experts for these parameters.
In the approach, it is proposed to define more precisely
Reference Accident Scenarios that can be compared to the
current concept of "credible scenarios" or "realistic scenarios".
These RAS are deterministic scenarios, but they are not
representative of the "worst case scenarios".
RAS are based on MPPS, completed with the influence of some
supplementary risk reducing measures selected among all
existing barriers. One of the main difficulties is the choice of the
relevant barriers for the definition of the RAS.
It is proposed to select them according to the criteria mentioned
in paragraph 3.1.2 (efficiency, availability and specific quality
criteria): first, the inherent and passive safety barriers and
second, some additional active and manual safety barriers that fit
the criteria.
This selection reflects the current practice in risk assessment and
are consistent with the lessons learnt from past accidents or
emergency exercises.
In this paper, only the general approach is described as a
framework to lead the risk assessment, which has to be
completed by a more detailed risk analysis.
3.2.2 Case studies
In this paragraph, some case studies are proposed. They are
related to a pressun'sed vessel of chlorine and linked pipelines.
X For a pressurised vessel of chlorine and linked pipelines,
MPPS are defined in the first chapter:
- the Critical Event is a loss of containment ;
- the MPPS are catastrophic rupture of the vessel, and
breach or pipe rupture.
French national regulation requires several safety elements
for a pressurised vessel of chlorine and linked pipelines.
Among them:
- The vessel has to be located in a containment room,
- The containment room has to be equipped with ventilation
and treatment systems,
- External pipelines have to be in pipe-in-pipe configuration.
a) Definition of RAS for the catastrophic rupture of a
pressurised vessel of toxic (liquefied) gas
Consequences of a catastrophic rupture depends mainly
on:
- Stored mass,
- Internal pressure when accident occurs.
The stored mass is assumed to be the maximal capacity
of tank, in accordance with operating conditions.
Storage pressure may be assumed to be:
1. normal operation conditions,
2. saturation pressure at ambient temperature (due to a
failure of heating or cooling system if different of 1 ),
3. maximum pressure (not precisely defined: in a range
of 1 to 3 times the proof test pressure).
In a conservative approach, for toxic (liquefied) gas such
as chlorine, the most stringent case will be defined,
according to pressure, meteorological conditions and
toxicity thresholds, and in accordance with risk analysis.
X First assumption:
The vessel is located outside, without any
containment room. So, catastrophic rupture of the
vessel can be regarded as a Reference Accident
Scenario.
X Second assumption:
The vessel is located in a containment room,
protected from thermal effects and mechanical
shocks. It is in conformity with pressure design codes
and it is equipped of automatic safety system for
overpressure and overflow. So, the catastrophic
rupture of the vessel will not be regarded as a
Reference Accident Scenario.
b) Definition of RAS from breach or pipe rupture of toxic
(liquefied) gas
Even protected by containment room or pipe-in-pipe
configuration, pipe rupture can be regarded as a
Reference Accident Scenario.
Consequences of a breach or a pipe rupture depends
mainly on:
- Leakage location,
- Release flow rate,
- Release duration.
The leak location is assumed to be on the highest
diameter pipe (maximum flow rate). The direction and the
height of jet depend on leakage location, as well as the
release flow rate. The flow rate assessment takes into
account upstream capacities, pipe and downstream
capacities volumes, and also non-return valves.
For a rupture located downstream of pumps,
compressors, or boiling vessels, the nominal flow rate of
these equipment can be used.
The release duration is linked to safety barriers and their
response time.
X First assumption:
The pipe is located outside, downstream of pumps,
without any particular safety element. So, the
duration of the leakage following the pipe rupture will
be high for the Reference Accident Scenario (almost
30 minutes), because of a quite long time for
detection by operator and manual shutdown action.
X Second assumption:
The pipe is located in a containment room, equipped
with permanent ventilation and treatment systems.
So, the duration of the leakage following the pipe
rupture will be smaller for the Reference Accident
Scenario (almost 10 minutes), because of an
immediate detection and a quite short manual
shutdown action. The ventilation and treatment
systems will be taken into account in consequence
assessment.
X Third assumption:
The pipe is used for loading or unloading operations,
under surveillance, with emergency stops. So, the
duration of the leakage following the pipe rupture will
be low for the Reference Accident Scenario (almost
2 minutes), because of an immediate manual
shutdown action.
3.2.3 Next steps
The work on the RAS is still going on with a working group
involving risk assessors and Competent Authorities. It is intended
to generalise the above-described examples to define a general
and systematic approach based on clear principles.
When achieved, this approach will be shared with the other
stakeholders involved in the risk decision-making process
(industrialists, the public, public authorities, elected
representatives...).
Since the risk management decisions are based on the risk
assessment [ 12 ] , and since the choices and hypothesis to
define the RAS are arbitrary, there is a need to reach a
consensus among all the stakeholders to limit the discrepancy in
the decision and improve the transparency.
Scenarios3.3 Identification of Residual Risk Assessment
(RRAS): preliminary considerations
In this paragraph, some preliminary considerations are given
about the definition of RRAS, which is currently in progress.
RRAS is based on RAS, completed by the influence of specific
technical and organisational risk-reducing measures.
The specific technical measures are generally similar to
additional automatic barriers (for example emergency shutdown
valves activated by gas detection).
The specific organisational measures, included in the safety
management systems, are generally similar to additional manual
barriers (for example emergency intervention procedures).
Thus, additional automatic and manual safety barriers are
regarded for the definition of Residual Risk Assessment
Scenarios.
However, they have to fit some safety requirements, related to
their availability and reliability. These requirements and criteria
will be defined in the next step of our works.
4. CONCLUSION
The methodology presented in this paper enables risk assessors
and competent authorities to identify Reference Accidents
Scenarios (RAS), by taking into account the influence of some
safety barriers, in accordance with the Seveso II Directive
requirements.
This method applies to most frequently met cases in high-risk
industries and pursues a deterministic approach.
It is the second stage of an overall approach in order to better
assess benefits and reliability of preventing and protecting
measures, either technical or organisational, thanks to more
detailed analysis, but without using any probabilistic method.
The first step of the methodology aims to highlight maximum
hazard potential in industrial establishments, by the definition of
Maximum Physically Possible Scenarios (MPPS).
The third and final stage of the methodology will enable to take
into account specific technical and organisational measures, in
the definition of Residual Risk Assessment Scenarios (RRAS).
The overall approach described in this paper represents an effort
of rationalisation and harmonisation of the current practices to
identify major industrial accidents. So as to achieve a level of full
harmonisation, this method should be completed by the
development of guidelines for the consequences modelling.
This method could help stakeholders in the public risk based
decision-making process to evaluate the safety level of high-risk
establishments:
MPPS could be selected for emergency and intervention
planning with emergency services,
RAS could be selected for land use planning around
hazardous installations,
RRAS could be selected by an industrial operator for the
demonstration of his efficient management of major-
accidents hazards.
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